Last May, it was reported that US Navy warships were to operate for the first time since the 1980s in the Barents Sea, close to the northern coast of Russia. The northwestern Arctic coast is Russia’s naval backyard. Like in the 1980s, the heart of the Russian Northern Fleet’s submarine force is anchored in Severomorsk on the Kola Peninsula. By 1980, the Northern Fleet had almost 50 percent of the Soviet Navy’s submarines – more than 200 boats ranging from diesel-electric to nuclear-powered ballistic missile classes. This sort of underwater platforms became a major weapon system in the Cold War because of their nuclear deterrence capability. Submarine deterrents were subject in Naval Forces IV/1980. Editorial director Vice Admiral (Ret.) Sir Ian McGeoch in his Editorial set out to discuss specific aspects concerning the West’s deployment of nuclear retaliatory systems at sea. At that time, the British, French and American inventory of submarine-launched nuclear weapons were described as the most survivable and endurable component of NATO’s strategic assets – other than the alliance’s more vulnerable battlefield nuclear weapons that could fall victim to a massive threat by a Soviet-led advance westward. Some were arguing at that time that submarine-launched nuclear weapons might well remain a credible deterrence in the 21th century. This still remains reality today. Since military tensions between the United States and Russia remain high six years after Russia annexed Crimea from neighbouring Ukraine, the existence of submarine forces on both sides capable of deploying ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads has roused the public again.
In a commentary, Sir Bernard Burrows, a retired British diplomat and Britain’s former Permanent Representative to NATO, gave an in-depth account of what Western Europe can do to exert significant influence of the solution of global problems in the early 1980s. His conclusion was that there were strict limitations. At that time, Western Europe’s power of action was largely confined to the European continent itself. But threats to their interests were arising more and more frequently outside Europe. The Europeans lost not only their capability to act at a distance but in most cases their will to do so. Until today, they are dependent upon the United States – the only global power that can act in ways which were favourable to European interests as a whole. Are those days now from a long-forgotten century?
