Mine countermeasures operations have changed dramatically over the past four decades. Unmanned minehunting has revolutionised the capabilities of naval forces around the world and as more things become autonomous, the competition to produce better and cheaper platforms – mine countermeasures vessels – has also grown. But what does this have to do with early 1981 when the second edition of Naval Forces was released? Well, why not question the reason for a substantial increase in capability at that time – as the result of the east-west confrontation? When Naval Forces II (1981) was approaching its global readership, it was clear that the mine was one of the most powerful of naval weapons. Admiral Sir James Eberle GCB, in the early 1980s NATO’s C-in-C Eastern Atlantic, stated in his article, entitled “Mine Warfare”, that the value of the mine to an enemy, such as the Soviet Union, was still not sufficiently appreciated by the alliance. He wrote that the application of modern technology has transformed the mine from a somewhat crude “hit or miss” weapon into a flexible and efficient instrument of war. NATO since the late 1970s was aware of increasing sophistication of mines; for the USSR and its allies, the modern mine was a robust, relatively simple and cheap weapon to manufacture in great quantities, and to deploy – notably in the Baltic Sea and the approaches to the North Atlantic, certainly to deny access by NATO fleets to the large submarine base at Murmansk on the Kola peninsula. Admiral Sir James Eberle was completely true when he emphasized that the USSR in the early 1980s possessed the world’s largest stockpile of mines of different kinds, deployable by surface ships of any kinds (including merchant vessels), submarines and aircraft. An estimation was made at over 300,000 pieces. Although the Soviets were unlikely to conduct a major offensive mining campaign in time of war, all the threats were to be subject to the risk of enemy (NATO) counter-action. The author concluded in this five-page feature that NATO mine countermeasures capacities at that time needed significant improvements, including: production of smaller basic MCMVs in a hunting or sweeping version in sufficient numbers; improved detection and classification capability of hull-mounted mine sonars; increasing speed of advance for exploratory MCM operations; and an improved mine recovery and analysis capability.
And the situation today? The principal challenge is to reduce the time it takes to find, identify and eliminate the deadly sea mine. Both advanced MCMVs and unmanned technology – remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) and other extended standoff ordnance detection methodologies – are to play a crucial role to combat the threat. Robotics are key to rapidly dismantle mine threats while minimizing the risk of exposing personnel to lethal minefields. This is one of the main consequences in NATO’s orientation today towards a stronger unmanned component, adding to the capability of traditional MCM methodologies.
