Nations in focus - The Black Sea Region

The port city of Sevastopol, which is located in southernmost Ukraine on the Crimean peninsula, is an important naval base due to the numerous inlets and bays along the coastline, accommodating naval ships of both the Ukraine and the Russian Black Sea Fleet.
(Photo: NASA Earth Observatory)

Infos to the articel:

Based in Prague, Czech Republic, Tomáš Chlebeček is an independent national security, defence, and naval analyst. He focuses on US and European defence policy, strategy, budgets and programmes, current military operations, intelligence, proliferation, arms control and terrorism. He is a regular contributor to Naval Forces magazine.

Nations in focus
The Black Sea Region

The Black Sea basin has experienced perhaps the most severe worsening of regional threat environment in the 21st Century on a global scale. In geopolitical terms, it has returned to a level of great power competition, confrontation, and conflict unseen since the Crimean War (1853-1856), World War I (1914-1918) and World War II (1941-1945), including combat operations at sea (since 2022). As a result, the region – largely considered a geopolitical backwater even during the Cold War (1947-1990) and especially since the dissolution of the Soviet Union (1991) – has been catapulted again into the global spotlight since Russian illegal seizure and annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol (2014).

Geostrategic context

It is important to understand existing inventories of maritime services of post-Soviet states – including the new Russian, Ukrainian and Georgian Navies (1992) – did not emerge as compact indigenous fleets but rather as collections of available elements of the original Soviet Black Sea Fleet (BSF) during a protracted, controversial, and acrimonious process of its partition (1992-1997). They have faced similar persistent challenges: block obsolescence of both platforms and their mission equipment; shortages of required personnel and skills; lack of upkeep and maintenance; low priority of naval affairs in national security decision-making and funding; and resulting lack of upkeep, maintenance, modernization and recapitalization efforts. However, these issues have plagued maritime services throughout post-communist Central and Eastern Europe, ranging from the Baltics to the Black Sea to the Adriatic. Since 2014, Crimea has enabled Vladimir Putin’s Russia – due to its strategic location and infrastructure – to regain a direct control of the central Black Sea and its traditional geopolitical position in the region.

The Russian guided missile cruiser Moskva (121), seen here at port in Sebastopol (Crimea) on 7 April 2022, led the naval assault against Ukraine from February 2022 until her sinking on 14 April. (Photo: Maxar Technologies)
The Russian guided missile cruiser Moskva (121), seen here at port in Sebastopol (Crimea) on 7 April 2022, led the naval assault against Ukraine from February 2022 until her sinking on 14 April. (Photo: Maxar Technologies)

These developments have brought hostile Russian air and naval forces to the doorstep of NATO’s European south-eastern flank (Romania, Bulgaria), operating on a peace footing, and largely still employing outmoded military capabilities dating back to the former Warsaw Pact era (1955-1991). Historically, the dominant naval force in the region has been the Russian Navy’s (VMF) BSF, gradually emerging from its long post-Soviet numerical decline, material decay and operational inactivity. It has been deployed extensively during the Russo-Georgian War (2008), takeover and annexation of Crimea and expeditionary deployments off Syria (since 2013). It has capitalized on its overwhelming superiority, lack of determined resistance and the absence of timely and sufficient foreign support for victims of Russian aggressions. However, post-Crimea international economic sanctions – despite their scope and other limitations – have managed to disrupt some of its major surface warship construction. As a result, there will be no additional Admiral Grigorovich class (Projekt 11356R) guided-missile frigates 

beyond the first three units in domestic service. Before the latest conflict (2022), the core of its capabilities still largely consisted of Soviet legacy equipment, complemented by more modern platforms, capable to employ 3M-14 Kalibr (NATO designation: SS-N-30A Sizzler) land attack sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs).

Russian casualties: Georgia and Ukraine

Georgia was the second country in the region – after landlocked Moldova – to experience repeated Russian aggression, at first through its support of an armed secessionist movement in Abkhazia during the Georgian Civil War (1992-1993) and later a full-scale invasion. During the lightning Russo-Georgian War, the most valuable assets of the small Georgian Navy were destroyed during the occupation of the port of Poti. As a result, it was disbanded, and its remnants merged with the Georgian Coast Guard (2009). As Abkhazia remains occupied in a ‘frozen conflict’ perpetuated by Moscow, it has been a permanent loss for Georgia. Its ports (Sukhumi) are off limits and Georgian maritime forces have been confined to bases in Georgia proper (Poti) and Adjaria (Batumi) ever since. Similarly, Ukraine lost the vast majority of its fleet due to largely unopposed takeover of its naval, air and military bases in Crimea. These losses amounted to at least 28 warships and 72 auxiliaries – partially out of service, decommissioned or unfinished – and a large cadre of personnel of the Ukrainian Naval Forces (VMS) and Sea Guard (MO) through mass defections. Consequently, it took three months for Ukraine to reclaim 

The Russian missile cruiser Moskva (identification number 121) had the highest combat power in the entire Black Sea until her sinking on 14 April 2022. The flagship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet can be seen here in a satellite image dated 7 April 2022. (Photo: Maxar Technologies)
The Russian missile cruiser Moskva (identification number 121) had the highest combat power in the entire Black Sea until her sinking on 14 April 2022. The flagship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet can be seen here in a satellite image dated 7 April 2022. (Photo: Maxar Technologies)

only a small portion of its military assets back, including four warships and 31 auxiliary vessels. Nine more ships were broken up by Russia and the remaining 56 vessels have never been returned. A handful of minor patrol craft were also destroyed or damaged during skirmishes with pro-Russian separatist forces off Mariupol in the Sea of Azov (2014-2015). In addition, the infamous Kerch Strait Incident (2018) led to the capture of both Gyurza-M class (Projekt 58155) gunboats and an accompanying tug, then on transit to the Sea of Azov. They were later returned (2019).
After the loss of Crimea, its bases and bulk of the fleet, the VMS correctly focused not on an ambitious but elusive plan for its rebuilding but on ensuring combat readiness of remaining ‘mosquito navy’ assets. Based on its recent combat experience, among key capabilities identified were coastal defence, fast attack and special forces insertion, crucially important in the most likely asymmetric warfare scenario in the littoral environment. Large-scale adoption of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) drone technology, as well as pioneering efforts in the field of loitering munitions and unmanned surface vessel (USV) employment, have been another logical step in this direction. As a result, the VMS at the eve of the war represented a lean but highly mobile, flexible and innovative force to be reckoned with, facts completely eluding its overconfident adversary. However, programmes for a major fleet recapitalization have been relatively slow in coming. As a reminder of its past shipbuilding capacity, the fourth Slava class (Projekt 1164 Atlant) guided-missile cruiser – the 95 percent complete ex-Ukraina – has been languishing in the port of Mykolaiv (since 1990) due to Ukrainian inability to finish it and Russian incompetence to negotiate its transfer. In terms of more contemporary equipment, the only completed larger vessel has been the medium reconnaissance vessel Simferopol (2022, 1,220 tonnes), based on earlier Projekt 502EM Laguna. The largest delivered foreign vessels have been five ex-US Coast Guard (USCG) Island class cutters (1986-1990, 168 tonnes), and more allied contributions are to follow thanks to the Maritime Capability Coalition (UK, Norway). However, the most significant domestic construction programme – four Volodymyr Velykyi class (Projekt 58250) 2,650-tonne frigates – has been faltering since its start as only the lead ship was laid down (2011). Subsequently, Ukraine ordered (2020) two Ada class (MİLGEM) 2,400-tonne guided-missile corvettes in Turkey to expedite the reconstitution of its naval capabilities. For the first time in its history, the VMS will gain modern multi-mission platforms of non-Soviet origin, armed with current offensive and defensive weapons systems. The lead unit (Hetman Ivan Mazepa) was already launched (October 2022) and its sister ship laid down (August 2023).

Ukraine at war

The full-fledged Russian invasion (February 2022) precipitated the loss of Ukraine’s Sea of Azov coastline along with a part of the Kherson region west of Crimea up to the Dnieper River delta. Consequently, Ukrainian naval assets located in the Sea of Azov – mostly gunboats, patrol craft and auxiliaries – were either destroyed or captured intact by the advancing enemy forces. A potential loss of the Black Sea coastal areas would not only deprive Ukraine of any hopes for national economic viability but also permanently change regional geopolitical reality. Due to a perilous situation on the southern front at the outset of hostilities, preparations were made to destroy naval assets located in the area of Russian advance, with hindsight rather prematurely. As a result, Ukraine suffered its most severe naval loss when the VMS flagship, guided-missile frigate Hetman Sahaydachny (KRIVAK III/Projekt 11351 Nerey), was scuttled in Mykolaiv while undergoing repairs to prevent its capture (March 2022). Despite being the largest, most capable and modern Ukrainian warship (1993), it is highly unlikely it will ever serve again. However, the dynamics of the conflict was already changing. The flagship of the BSF – cruiser Moskva (ex-Slava) – sank off the Ukrainian coast after a failed rescue attempt, following heavy damage incurred in a secondary missile magazine explosion (April 2022). It represents the worst Russian combat loss and surface warship disaster not only in the current conflict, but the largest modern warship destroyed by enemy action and a guided missile globally since WW II, curiously on the 40th anniversary of the Falklands War (1982). Its demise was caused by a successful VMS strike employing two of its

Open source material suggests Ukrainian Marines were transported with one Konstantin Olshanskyi class (ROPUCHA-I type) LSTs, one ALLIGATOR type LST and two POMORNIK type LCACs. Based in proximity to the marine brigade, these ships are now held by Russian Federation naval personnel at Sevastopol. Pictured is the ROPUCHA-I type LST Konstantin Olshanskyi (U 402). (Photo: US Navy)
Open source material suggests Ukrainian Marines were transported with one Konstantin Olshanskyi class (ROPUCHA-I type) LSTs, one ALLIGATOR type LST and two POMORNIK type LCACs. Based in proximity to the marine brigade, these ships are now held by Russian Federation naval personnel at Sevastopol. Pictured is the ROPUCHA-I type LST Konstantin Olshanskyi (U 402). (Photo: US Navy)

indigenous RK-360MT Neptune land-based subsonic anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), entering service recently (March 2021), in cooperation with Bayraktar TB2 unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs). The Moskva fell victim to a disturbingly predictable pattern of operations of Russian amphibious and covering forces in the area. As a large multi-mission combatant, it is indeed irreplaceable as Russia now possesses only three active cruisers – plus another to emerge from a protracted modernization – with no comparable units planned. It also meant no amphibious operation towards Odesa would ever materialize but Moscow still hoped to draw sizeable Ukrainian ground forces through an offensive employment of the BSF. However, the loss of Snake Island (June 2022) represented the end of local Russian naval hegemony, despite continuing blockade. Some of the most stunning exploits of the war have been the magnitude and geographic reach of Ukrainian strike operations. At the start of the conflict, it was a forgone conclusion advancing forces would eventually take control of the Black Sea coastline, but Ukraine was able to turn the tables on Russia in the most critical theatre with meagre means. The key challenge has been periodic but sustained naval stand-off campaign against targets inland by both the BSF and Caspian Flotilla (CF) employing Kalibr SLCMs, although its overall military effectiveness remains dubious.

As Ukraine still lacks comparable long-range precision-guided munitions (PGMs), its approach has been innovative, using all available Soviet legacy and Western-supplied weapons systems, often re-purposed from their primary missions. They include OTR-21 Tochka (NATO designation: SS-21 Scarab) tactical ballistic missiles (TBMs), RGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship missiles, stealthy MBDA Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), TB2 UCAV and recently developed MAGURA V5 (Maritime Autonomous Guard Unmanned Robotic Apparatus) USV. As a result, successful series of strikes have been mounted against Snake Island (May/June 2022), Kerch Bridge (October 2022/July 2023), ports and naval bases at Berdiansk (March 2022), Sevastopol (October 2022/September 2023), Donuzlav Bay (February 2024), Feodosia (December 2023), Kerch (November 2023) and even Novorossiysk (August 2023). Several critical facilities have been destroyed, including the BSF headquarters in Sevastopol (September 2023). In no other domain has been Russian military dominance over Ukraine so disproportionate as at sea, but the VMF has clearly contributed the least to the overall Russian military effort, proving largely operationally ineffective.
Ukrainian forces have managed to functionally destroy at least 16 and damage additional six confirmed Russian naval vessels – much larger and more capable than its own – including some of the most valuable assets. In addition to the Moskva, the VMF has lost two guided-missile corvettes (Askold – Karakurt class/Projekt 22800, Ivanovets – TARANTUL III/Projekt 12411 Molniya), a large patrol ship (Sergey Kotov – Vasily Bykov class/Projekt 22160), a conventionally-powered submarine (Rostov-na-Donu – Improved KILO II/Projekt 636.3 Varshavyanka), four amphibious landing ships (Minsk, Novocherkassk, Tsezar Kunikov – Ropucha class/Projekt 775/II, Saratov – Alligator class/Projekt 1171 Tapir), one landing craft (Serna class/Projekt 11770), five small patrol boats and a large rescue tug (Project 22870). Several of the sunken vessels were damaged previously, among additional casualties have been another landing ship (Olenegorsky Gornyak – Ropucha class), a minesweeper (Natya class/Projekt 266M Akvamarin), two landing craft (Serna class, Ondatra class/Projekt 1176 Akula) and two small patrol boats. In contrast, at least nine vessels of the VMS and MO have been confirmed destroyed but 17 captured and three minor craft damaged. In addition to its flagship, these losses amount to a command ship (Amur class/Projekt 304), two large patrol boats (Island class, Stenka class/Projekt 205P Tarantul), four gunboats (Gyurza-M class, three captured), three small patrol boats (Zhuk class/Projekt 1400M Grif, two captured), an inshore minesweeper (Yevgenya class/Projekt 1258 Korund), a seagoing tugboat (Sorum class/Projekt 745, captured), twelve minor patrol craft (eleven captured) and one tugboat.

Lessons relearned

In an ironic way, the experience from recent conflicts with Putin’s Russia in the Black Sea (2008, 2014, since 2022) has relived the history of the Crimean War, Russian Civil War (1917-1923) and both World Wars when the tsarist Russia/Soviet Union was losing territory on the coastline, leading to a lack of suitable operational bases in the vicinity of front lines. Consequently, these developments disabled its surface forces from operating effectively against the enemy, even when they were superior in both capability and numbers. Such turn of events necessitated protracted defensive campaigns initiated from secondary bases with insufficient infrastructure, employing largely asymmetric tactics and means while incurring heavy losses (1917-1920, 1941-1944). After 2014, the VMS found itself in a much more complicated situation, facing defensive littoral operations in a contested environment against a dominant adversary. However, it draws fundamentally sound conclusions from its geographical environment and historical experience. The key for the future has been a sustained effort to train and equip its personnel with the assistance of major NATO partners (US, UK), restart production of small surface combatants (Gyurza-M class) and development of indigenous strike capabilities (RK-360 Neptune). Given extremely adverse domestic economic conditions and geopolitical environment, innovative

The core of the Turkish Naval Forces consists of twelve HDW Class 209 submarines built in Germany, 16 frigates, nine corvettes, 18 missile speed boats, 16 patrol boats, eleven mine countermeasures units and 34 landing ships and boats. Pictured is a Preveze class (HDW Class 209/1400) submarine. (Photo: Turkish Naval Forces Command)
The core of the Turkish Naval Forces consists of twelve HDW Class 209 submarines built in Germany, 16 frigates, nine corvettes, 18 missile speed boats, 16 patrol boats, eleven mine countermeasures units and 34 landing ships and boats. Pictured is a Preveze class (HDW Class 209/1400) submarine. (Photo: Turkish Naval Forces Command)

concepts of operations (CONOPS) and employment of low-cost strike solutions (MAGURA V5) – including manned-unmanned teaming – have been implemented to offset seemingly overwhelming Russian dominance. The Ukrainian Marine Corps (MP) also proved to be a capable and determined force (Mariupol) and was subsequently elevated to an independent service branch (May 2023) in charge of coastal defence. As in the past, distributed, flexible and mobile light surface forces with air and special forces support – now possessing long-range PGMs and electronic warfare (EW) capabilities – can successfully establish local anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) zones to prevent the adversary from exploiting its overall superiority and geographical advantage. Close cooperation with the Ukrainian Air Force (PS), Defence Intelligence (HUR) and its secretive Group 13 naval strike unit – with sustained and revolutionary allied intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) support – has contributed to a remarkable level of jointness. Consequently, the pace of Russian naval losses has kept accelerating since last year.

Allied response

Despite a slow process of regional force augmentation in the framework of NATO Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP), these measures were largely limited to ground and air deployments, predominantly on the eastern flank (since 2016). Periodic boosting of allied maritime capabilities in the Black Sea falls largely on the US Navy (USN) Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, the Royal Navy (RN) and elements of NATO Response Force (NRF), mostly Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (SNMG2) and Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group 2 (SNMCMG2). For years, regional cooperation has been fostered by port visits, NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) Exercise “Sea Breeze” and the Black Sea Naval Force (BLACKSEAFOR), effectively discontinued after 2008/2014. Such freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) has repeatedly led – as in the Baltic Sea – to incidents with Russian air and naval forces due to their aggressive, reckless and unprofessional behaviour, occasionally bordering on seeking an unprovoked confrontation in international waters. Among the most serious episodes have been ‘buzzing’ overflights of guided-missile destroyers USS Donald Cook (April 2014), USS Ross (May 2015) and HMS Defender with accompanying frigate HNLMS Evertsen (June 2021). After the start of hostilities, these close calls culminated in the mid-air collision and crash of US Air Force (USAF) MQ-9 Reaper UAV (March 2023).
Despite keeping a low profile in order to avoid undesirable escalation, the role of NATO allies – Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey – in regional maritime security operations (MSO) has been indispensable, including active participation of their mine countermeasures (MCM) assets during the war. Turkey, the strongest naval actor in the region, has been effectively blocking the Straits for possible reinforcements of both warring parties. However, its principled adherence to the Montreux Convention (1936) affected not only the BSF but also the VMS. Its two newly acquired ex-RN Sandown class (1999-2001, 590 tonnes) minehunters were unable to reach home waters (2023). 

The Turkish Naval Forces’ first amphibious assault ship, TCG “Anadolu” (L 400), was commissioned into service on 19 April 2023. (Photo: Turkish Naval Forces Command)
The Turkish Naval Forces’ first amphibious assault ship, TCG “Anadolu” (L 400), was commissioned into service on 19 April 2023. (Photo: Turkish Naval Forces Command)

The UN-sponsored Black Sea Grain Initiative (July 2022 to July 2023), facilitated by Ankara, temporarily provided a relief for global agricultural markets and developing countries despite Russian mining efforts and faltering distant naval blockade of Ukraine. Curiously, the most impressive results have been accomplished since Moscow’s unilateral withdrawal from the programme. As a result, Ukraine established an independent corridor for merchant shipping in the western part of the Black Sea (September 2023) through territorial waters of regional NATO allies to its key seaports (Odesa, Chornomorsk, Izmail, Reni, Pivdennyi). It has been proven a resounding success, so far used by over 700 cargo ships, fully re-establishing Ukraine’s maritime trade and overseas exports. After two years of war, the conflict continues unabated – including Russian long-range strike campaign targeting Ukrainian port infrastructure – necessitating constant allied vigilance, indefinite military support of Ukraine and acceleration of overdue and still lagging recapitalization of both Romanian and Bulgarian navies.

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